What is an “indictable offence” pursuant to article 2402 C.C.Q.? Justice Marie St-Pierre, in the recent Quebec Court of Appeal decision Desjardins Sécurité Financière, compagnie d’assurance-vie c. Émond, answers this question.
In this decision, Desjardins Sécurité Financière, compagnie d’assurance-vie [Desjardins] appealed a judgement of the Court of Quebec rendered by Justice Céline Gervais. Justice Gervais had concluded that the exclusion clause found in the insurance policy issued by Desjardins in the event of an accidental death resulting from an indictable offence did not apply to the present case seeing since Sébastien Foisy’s death did not result from his participation in an “indictable offence” pursuant to article 2402 C.C.Q.:
| 2402. In non-marine insurance, any general clause whereby the insurer is released from his obligations if the law is violated is deemed not written, unless the violation is an indictable offence. |
Desjardins had issued the insurance policy to Mr. Foisy on July 7, 2009. It included life insurance in the event of an accidental death. However, section 14 of the insurance policy stated that there existed no right to the life insurance policy’s benefit “if the accident occurred during the insured’s participation in any indictable offence or any offence that is related to it” (our translation).
On July 8, 2009, Mr. Foisy was on his motorcycle riding at a speed of 123 km/h in a 50 km/h zone when he rode past a Sûreté du Québec officer’s radar. A police chase ensued over the next twenty kilometers, reaching speeds of up to 200 km/h.
In a curve, the insured lost control of his motorcycle and landed in a ditch.
The officer pursuing him also lost control of his vehicle which hit Mr. Foisy while he was lying in the ditch. He was then projected into the air and landed on the side of the road. When the ambulance arrived, Mr. Foisy was unconscious. He died approximately thirty minutes later in the emergency room after suffering from cardio-respiratory distress.
Although the coroner was able to determine the most likely cause of Mr. Foisy’s death, he was unable to establish if his death resulted from his motorcycle skidding into the ditch, his impact with the officer’s vehicle or his impact with the road after he was projected into the air.
Following his death, Desjardins refused to pay his heirs the benefit of the life insurance policy since his death resulted in their opinion from his participation in an indictable offence.
Mr. Foisy could have been charged with two offences:
- Dangerous operation of a motor vehicle (article 249 of the Criminal Code)
- Flight (article 249.1 of the Criminal Code).
These offences are said to be hybrid seeing as they are punishable by indictment or by summary conviction.
Desjardins submitted that a hybrid offence is an “indictable offence” pursuant to article 2402 C.C.Q. given section 34(1)(a) of the Federal Interpretation Act (RSC 1985, c I-21) which reads as follows:
| Indictable and summary conviction offences
34(1) Where an enactment creates an offence, (a) the offence is deemed to be an indictable offence if the enactment provides that the offender may be prosecuted for the offence by indictment; (our emphasis) |
Mr. Foisy’s heirs contested Desjardin’s position arguing that the police chase had ended at the time of the fatal impact and none of the offences for which Mr. Foisy could have been charged constituted an “indictable offence” pursuant to article 2402 C.C.Q. They submitted that the expression’s reach must be limited. They also added that notwithstanding the interpretation given to “indictable offence”, the evidence did not establish that Mr. Foisy’s death occurred during the dangerous operation of a motor vehicle or during the police pursuit, contrary to Desjardins’ claims.
Following a thorough analysis of case law and doctrine, Justice St-Pierre concluded that “indictable offence” refers only to offences punishable by indictment; it would thus exclude hybrid offences. This is the interpretation which is the “most respectful of the context within which we find [article 2402 C.C.Q.]” (our translation) according to Justice St-Pierre.
While Justice St-Pierre recognized that article 2402 C.C.Q. refers to federal provisions, she stated that the “referral remains general in the sense that it does not refer to a precise definition and more particularly to the Interpretation Act” . Therefore, “the task of interpreting the expression which was given to the Courts must take into account that this concept of federal law generally finds itself within a context of civil law, specifically insurance law”.
Justice St-Pierre summarizes her position as follows:
| This is respectful of the Quebec legislature’s intention in the specific context of the legislative environment within which this article is found (the insurance contract where the legislature wished to restore the balance of power) while taking into account the circumstances which lead to its enunciation (protecting the insured in light of the exclusions listed in the insurance contract), of the object it seeks to achieve and of the values to which it corresponds (supervising the use of general exclusion clauses by limiting their reach to the most serious violations of the law all the while recognizing that the insurer has the right to include specific exclusions and allowing the policyholder or the insurer, as applicable, to know precisely, from the day he contracts with the insurer, in which cases there will be loss of entitlement to the benefits for which the insurer is bound). [Our translation] |
Justice St-Pierre completed her analysis by stating that her interpretation does not mean that insurers cannot exclude accidental deaths resulting from hybrid offences. It is simply necessary to do so with an explicit exclusion.
This unanimous decision could have a significant impact for insurers in terms of exclusions. In virtue of this decision, insurers would explicitly have to state which hybrid offences they wish to exclude from policy coverage.
It remains to be seen however if the Quebec Court of Appeal’s decision will be maintained since the Supreme Court of Canada granted the application for leave to appeal on June 30, 2016.
A commentary by Gabrielle Ferland, from our Insurance Law Practice Group.