In a recent decision, Michel Grenier v. Me Julie Charbonneau, Roger Picard and Conseil de discipline de l’Ordre des psychologues du Québec, rendered on June 4, 2025, the Superior Court revisited the principles applicable to the immunity of members of a professional order’s disciplinary council to rule on a Motion to Dismiss. The delay to appeal has not yet expired.
Facts
In 2015, the Plaintiff worked as a psychologist on a school board.
In May 2015, a complaint against the Plaintiff was submitted to the Ordre des psychologues du Québec (hereinafter “the Order“).
In September 2015, following an investigation by the Order’s syndic, a complaint was filed against the Plaintiff.
The complaint was heard, and after eight (8) days of hearings, the Order’s Disciplinary Council (hereinafter the “Council“), rendered a decision in which it found the Plaintiff guilty under the Professional Code and the Code of Ethics of Psychologists.
Six months later, the Council rendered its decision on sanction.
The Plaintiff appealed the decision, but their motion was dismissed by the Tribunal des professions.
The Plaintiff then applied to the Superior Court to have the judgment of the Tribunal des professions and the decisions of the Council set aside. However, the Superior Court dismissed the appeal for judicial review.
The Plaintiff subsequently appealed the Superior Court’s decision, but the Court of Appeal dismissed the application.
Following this process, in November 2024, the Plaintiff filed an Originating Judicial Application in damages against the Council, claiming the sum of $525,600.00.
The Defendants then filed Motions to Dismiss, pursuant to articles 51 and 168 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Decision
The Court had to determine whether the Plaintiff’s Originating Judicial Application was abusive, thereby justifying its dismissal.
It noted that the Plaintiff essentially criticized the Defendants for having acted with partiality, bad faith, malice and intent to injure.
Furthermore, the Plaintiff only attacked the decisions rendered by the Council. It is our understanding that the Plaintiff did not agree with the Council’s interpretation of the evidence.
The Court went as far as stating that the Plaintiff’s proceedings and attacks were tantamount to quarrelsomeness within the meaning of article 51 C.C.P., since the allegations against the Defendants had all been unsuccessfully pleaded before the various courts. However, the Court did not declare the Plaintiff to be a “quarrelsome litigant”, disregarding the quarrelsome nature of the proceedings in reaching its decision.
The Court concluded that the Plaintiff’s action was manifestly unfounded because the Council was protected by immunity under the Professional Code for acts performed in good faith in the exercise of their functions, and good faith is presumed. The allegations were insufficient to waive the immunity provided for in the Professional Code.
The Court noted that even if the alleged facts were taken as proven (regardless of the Plaintiff’s characterization of them), it was impossible to conclude that the action had the slightest chance of success. The alleged facts did not constitute a fault.
The Court concluded that it would be abusive to allow the Plaintiff to revisit issues that had already been analyzed and decided by the other courts.
Take away
The principle that a plaintiff must be given the opportunity to be heard on the merits of their case remains. However, when an action raises issues that have already been definitively decided by other courts, that action must be dismissed. As the Court pointed out, allowing such an action to continue would be abusive.
