{"id":31810,"date":"2026-08-27T11:46:54","date_gmt":"2026-08-27T15:46:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.rsslex.com\/?p=31810"},"modified":"2026-08-27T11:46:54","modified_gmt":"2026-08-27T15:46:54","slug":"2026-world-cup-fifa-can-commercialise-the-tournament-but-not-trust","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.rsslex.com\/en\/bulletins-en\/sports-law\/2026-world-cup-fifa-can-commercialise-the-tournament-but-not-trust\/","title":{"rendered":"2026 World Cup: FIFA Can Commercialise the Tournament, But Not Trust"},"content":{"rendered":"<h2>Introduction<\/h2>\n<p>With 48 teams, 104 matches, three host countries and 39 days of competition, the 2026 World Cup was already destined to make history because of its sheer scale.<\/p>\n<p>On the field, with a transformed VAR system (<em>Video Assistant Referee<\/em>) and FIFA&#8217;s new regulations, every player action was subjected to microscopic scrutiny. Off the field, however, the rules appeared considerably more flexible.<\/p>\n<p>Thanks to a sensor capable of analysing the ball&#8217;s movements 500 times per second, officials could detect contact as slight as the brush of a single hair. Yet that same rigour seemed to soften when it came to drawing the line between disciplinary independence and political pressure, or between player welfare and commercial imperatives.<\/p>\n<h2>1 \u2013 Regulations<\/h2>\n<h3>Football&#8217;s rules evolve slowly, one touch at a time.<\/h3>\n<p>On the eve of the 2026 World Cup, however, FIFA took a far more ambitious approach. A World Cup no longer simply applies the Laws of the Game; it arguably puts them to the test. For the 2026 edition, FIFA introduced more amendments at a single meeting of the International Football Association Board (IFAB) than in all previous editions combined. A red card for covering one&#8217;s mouth during an altercation, timed countdowns, mandatory departure delays for substituted players, temporary removals following certain medical treatments: each of these measures responded to a specific, documented and often highly publicised incident. Yet their collective adoption, immediately before the largest tournament in football history, transformed the World Cup into a full-scale testing ground, with forty-eight national teams and millions of spectators serving as the subjects of the experiment.<\/p>\n<p>The rule regarding the covering of the mouth illustrates this dynamic particularly well. It originated directly from the Prestianni-Vin\u00edcius J\u00fanior incident. During a Champions League match in February 2026, Argentine winger Gianluca Prestianni was accused by Vin\u00edcius J\u00fanior, supported by Kylian Mbapp\u00e9, of making racist remarks while covering his mouth with his shirt. As UEFA was unable to substantiate the racism allegation, FIFA President Gianni Infantino adopted a clear position following the incident: covering one&#8217;s mouth creates a &#8220;presumption of guilt.&#8221; This reasoning inspired the current rule, under which the act of concealment itself becomes an element of the offence, regardless of whether the content of the statements can be proven.<\/p>\n<p>Even more significant was the expansion of VAR&#8217;s scope beyond its four traditional categories (goals, penalties, direct red cards and mistaken identity) to include clearly erroneous second yellow cards and certain incorrectly awarded corner kicks. Each expansion, viewed in isolation, addresses a legitimate concern. Yet their cumulative effect has shifted VAR from an exceptional corrective mechanism toward a form of near-permanent second officiating. The shift has been so significant that IFAB reportedly felt compelled to caution FIFA during the tournament following cards issued to Breel Embolo and Miguel Almir\u00f3n, with inconsistencies between referees proving the predictable consequence of a system whose scope expanded faster than the doctrine governing its application.<\/p>\n<p>A Croatian goal was disallowed during a Round of 16 match against Portugal after connected-ball technology detected contact with what appeared to be a strand of Igor Matanovi\u0107&#8217;s hair before the ball travelled into the net. The incident raises two distinct questions. The first is technological: was there contact? The second is legal: what consequence should the rules attach to such a minimal contact? Technology can measure facts with greater precision than human senses; it cannot determine whether the resulting outcome remains consistent with the spirit of the game.<\/p>\n<p>Three principles are challenged by situations of this kind: the proportionality of a sanction bearing little relationship to its cause, the foreseeability of a rule that no player could reasonably anticipate, and compliance with a &#8220;clear and obvious error&#8221; standard that is inherently contradicted by contact invisible to the naked eye. The issue is therefore not the existence of technology itself, but the absence of a clear limit on its intervention.<\/p>\n<p>FIFA was able to establish scientifically that a strand of hair had touched the ball. It appeared considerably less certain when political power touched the disciplinary process.<\/p>\n<h2>2 \u2013 When Politics Becomes Involved in Sport<\/h2>\n<h3>The Balogun Affair<\/h3>\n<p>During the Round of 16 match between the United States, one of the host nations, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, American striker Folarin Balogun received a red card after stepping on the ankle of Bosnian defender Tarik Muharemovi\u0107. The regulatory consequence appeared straightforward. Article 66(4) of the FIFA Disciplinary Code provides that a sending-off automatically results in suspension for the following match. Article 10(5) of the Regulations for the 2026 FIFA World Cup establishes the same principle while allowing for the imposition of additional sanctions.<\/p>\n<p>Balogun ultimately did not serve that suspension. Although a one-match suspension was imposed, its execution was suspended and converted into a &#8220;one-match suspension suspended on probation for a period of one year.&#8221; In other words, the American striker was permitted to participate in the next match, although he risked having to serve the suspension if he committed another offence during the probationary period.<\/p>\n<p>This decision followed a telephone call from Donald Trump to FIFA President Gianni Infantino requesting that FIFA reconsider what he believed to have been an unjust red card. Trump publicly acknowledged making the request while denying that he sought a specific outcome. Infantino, for his part, stated that he had not intervened and only became aware of the decision after it had been issued.<\/p>\n<p>The sequence of events in the Balogun affair nevertheless raised a serious question regarding the appearance of independence within the disciplinary process. In such matters, it is not enough for the decision-maker to be genuinely independent; the process itself must also inspire confidence. Would an ordinary federation, lacking direct access to FIFA&#8217;s president, have obtained the same reconsideration and benefited from such an exceptional measure? Why was the decision not immediately accompanied by detailed reasons explaining its justification?<\/p>\n<p>According to Yann Roche, Professor in the Department of Geography at UQAM and President of the Geopolitical Observatory of the Raoul-Dandurand Chair, the decision&#8217;s greatest risk was the precedent it created. Once a head of state can personally request reconsideration of a sanction affecting a national team, other political leaders may be tempted to do the same. As he observed, &#8220;the moment the rule is no longer respected, no one will apply it anymore.&#8221; Every red card and every unfavourable decision could then become subject not only to the established sporting appeal mechanisms but also to political intervention. The announcement, made on the eve of the match against Belgium, also reduced the time available for Belgium to adapt its preparations.<\/p>\n<p>In an unusually severe statement, UEFA asserted that FIFA had &#8220;crossed a red line.&#8221; Such a decision also created a precedent requiring comparable cases to be treated in the same manner going forward. The Norwegian Football Federation likewise announced its intention to seek authorisation from its board to file a complaint before FIFA&#8217;s Ethics Committee.<\/p>\n<p>The controversy therefore extends far beyond the question of whether Balogun&#8217;s conduct actually warranted a red card. FIFA may well have possessed a regulatory basis for its decision. In a context marked by public intervention from a head of state, however, that formal authority was insufficient to dispel concerns regarding independence, transparency and equal treatment. The more exceptional a decision, the greater the obligation to explain it should be.<\/p>\n<p>This issue is particularly important because sport has long served as an instrument of power and international influence, inseparable from significant economic interests. That reality makes the decisional independence of a regulator such as FIFA, which is expected to remain politically neutral, all the more essential.<\/p>\n<h2>3 \u2013 When Player Protection Becomes a Commercial Inventory<\/h2>\n<h3>A Legitimate Protective Objective, But Not Necessarily a Proportionate Measure<\/h3>\n<p>For the first time, FIFA made three-minute hydration breaks mandatory at approximately the 22nd and 67th minutes of every match, regardless of weather conditions or whether the stadium was covered. The rationale, namely protecting players from North American heat, is not artificial: the risk is genuine, and a uniform rule simplifies team preparation. Yet uniformity raises questions that FIFPRO, the international players&#8217; union, itself raised when noting that it had never requested mandatory hydration breaks. Why impose the same interruption at 35 degrees Celsius and inside a climate-controlled stadium? Would meteorological criteria not have been sufficient?<\/p>\n<p>Moreover, formal equality masks a sporting asymmetry. A break afforded equally to both teams does not necessarily have an equal sporting impact. It interrupts the momentum of the dominant team while simultaneously providing a free recovery period to a team under pressure.<\/p>\n<h3>From a Protective Measure to an Advertising Window<\/h3>\n<p>Historically, football has distinguished itself from North American sports through the absence of structural stoppages: no time-outs, no quarters, only a halftime interval separating two uninterrupted forty-five-minute periods. That continuity is precisely what supporters cherish: a flow that stops for no one, not even television.<\/p>\n<p>Hydration breaks altered that reality by creating, for the first time, a dedicated advertising opportunity within active playing time. This is not to suggest that FIFA introduced hydration breaks solely for commercial purposes. The stronger argument is more measured: even if genuinely motivated by player welfare, a measure with such foreseeable commercial value called for greater transparency regarding its necessity and its impact on the game.<\/p>\n<h3>Economic Impact<\/h3>\n<p>The economic returns generated by the tournament were extraordinary. According to reported estimates, FIFA generated more than USD 9 billion in revenue in 2026 alone, approximately 75% more than during the previous edition. FIFA now estimates that revenues for the entire 2023-2026 cycle could exceed USD 15 billion.<\/p>\n<p>This expansionary logic may continue. Having added 16 teams and 40 additional matches in 2026, FIFA has indicated that it will consider expanding the tournament to 64 teams as early as 2030.<\/p>\n<p>If, as Gianni Infantino has stated, FIFA&#8217;s mission is to use football&#8217;s popularity as a vehicle for human, social, sustainable and inclusive development, a paradox nonetheless remains. Football is arguably the most accessible sport in the world to play, requiring very little equipment. Yet it has become one of the most expensive sports to watch at its highest level. Despite the availability of a limited number of USD 60 tickets reserved for supporters of qualified teams, the official price of some tickets for the final exceeded USD 7,000 only days before the match. Those who create football&#8217;s atmosphere were, for many purposes, reduced to the role of television viewers.<\/p>\n<p>The ultimately abandoned FIFA Forward Enterprise proposal illustrated this tension even more clearly. FIFA&#8217;s current president proposed transferring the association&#8217;s commercial and event-related activities into a separate subsidiary and allowing private investors to acquire a minority stake of up to 20%, thereby raising as much as USD 4.2 billion. A minority investment would not necessarily have transferred legal control of FIFA, but it would have raised numerous questions. What veto or information rights would investors receive? What return expectations would apply to the subsidiary? What safeguards would prevent financial interests from influencing scheduling, competition formats or ticket pricing? Faced with opposition from several confederations and member associations, FIFA ultimately withdrew the proposal on 31 July 2026.<\/p>\n<p>FIFA may commercialise the World Cup. It should not make inaccessible to its own supporters a sport whose universal character it claims to protect.<\/p>\n<h2><strong>Conclusion \u2013 FIFA Can Commercialise the Tournament, But Not the Trust on Which Its Authority Depends<\/strong><\/h2>\n<p>VAR corrects errors that human officiating could not detect. A sporting body is entitled to evolve under political pressure from its stakeholders without every exchange being inherently objectionable. Protecting players from heat is a legitimate objective. Nothing prevents a non-profit organisation from generating commercial revenues or, subject to appropriate safeguards, seeking private investment.<\/p>\n<p>Yet every issue addressed in this article points to the same requirement: credible sports governance requires clear, predictable and uniformly applied rules; technological interventions proportionate to what they seek to correct; independent and reasoned disciplinary decisions; transparency regarding political and commercial interests; genuine consultation with those most directly affected by regulatory change (players, associations and supporters); and periodic review of the consequences produced by every innovation once it is tested in practice.<\/p>\n<p>FIFA may modernise its rules, commercialise its competitions and welcome investors. It cannot, however, treat as just another asset the trust that gives legitimacy to its regulatory authority. By seeking to correct every contact, revisit every card and monetise every silence, FIFA risks regulating football until it exhausts what makes the game worth watching in the first place.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Introduction With 48 teams, 104 matches, three host countries and 39 days of competition, the 2026 World Cup was already destined to make history because of its sheer scale. On the field, with a transformed VAR system (Video Assistant Referee) and FIFA&#8217;s new regulations, every player action was subjected to microscopic scrutiny. Off the field, [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":18,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":true,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[294],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-31810","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-sports-law"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v28.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>2026 World Cup: FIFA Can Commercialise the Tournament, But Not Trust - RSS - Robinson Sheppard Shapiro<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.rsslex.com\/en\/bulletins-en\/sports-law\/2026-world-cup-fifa-can-commercialise-the-tournament-but-not-trust\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"2026 World Cup: FIFA Can Commercialise the Tournament, But Not Trust - RSS - Robinson Sheppard Shapiro\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Introduction With 48 teams, 104 matches, three host countries and 39 days of competition, the 2026 World Cup was already destined to make history because of its sheer scale. 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